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ABSTRACT
Because of the open access nature of wireless communications, wireless networks can suffer from malicious activity, such
as jamming attacks, aimed at undermining the network’s ability to sustain communication links and acceptable throughput.
One important consideration when designing networks is to appropriately tune the network topology and its connectiv-
ity so as to support the communication needs of those participating in the network. This paper examines the problem of
interference attacks that are intended to harm connectivity and throughput, and illustrates the method of mapping network
performance parameters into the metric of topographic connectivity. Specifically, this paper arrives at anti-jamming strate-
gies aimed at coping with interference attacks through a unified stochastic game. In such a framework, an entity trying to
protect a network faces a dilemma: (i) the underlying motivations for the adversary can be quite varied, which depends
largely on the network’s characteristics such as power and distance; (ii) the metrics for such an attack can be incompara-
ble (e.g., network connectivity and total throughput). To deal with the problem of such incomparable metrics, this paper
proposes using the attack’s expected duration as a unifying metric to compare distinct attack metrics because a longer-
duration of unsuccessful attack assumes a higher cost. Based on this common metric, a mechanism of maxmin selection
for an attack prevention strategy is suggested. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The connection properties of a wireless network can
degrade easily with adverse environments, such as a tall
building that obstruct signals or strong noise that interferes
with normal communications. Links breaking is a com-
mon phenomena in wireless communications. However, if
a malicious jammer purposely breaks a link and separates
a node from a network, this harmful behavior can seriously
interrupt the normal operation of the network, especially if
the node happens to be the hub of several routes. Therefore,
investigating the impact of the removal of critical nodes
and analyzing the jammer’s strategy in choosing a node for
an attack is essential to maintain network connectivity in
adversarial settings.
Many techniques have been presented to detect the
intrusive behavior of an attacker. In [1], a survey of intru-
sion detection techniques is given. In [2], several host-
based and network-based intrusion detection systems are
surveyed as well as their characteristics are described.
In [3], a Bayesian approach was used to detect an intruder
in a spectrum band while taking into account whether the
intruder sneaks for file-downloading or streaming video.
In [4], a Bayesian learning mechanism is used to design a
scanning strategy if there is incomplete knowledge whether
the intruder is present. In [5], fictitious play from game the-
ory is adopted to classify the type of a jammer based on
the historical belief in the throughput under attack uncer-
tainty. In [6] and [7], data mining techniques to recognize
anomalies as well as known intrusions are presented. In [8],
a lightweight and generic localization algorithm is devel-
oped for finding the location of a jamming device after
detecting its malicious activity. In [9], an algorithm of
localization in peer to peer networks based on Q-learning
approach is suggested. However, none of these papers con-
sidered the intruder’s impact on network connectivity nor
mechanisms that can maintain connectivity in the presence
of such an adversary.
In this paper, different anti-jamming strategies ver-
sus jamming attacks aimed at harming different network
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characteristics, like connectivity or throughput, are inves-
tigated in a uniform framework. In such a situation, an
entity intending to protect a network faces a problem
that while an adversary might apply a fixed set of jam-
ming tools, the underlying intent or strategy behind an
attack can be quite varied, depending largely upon the
network’s characteristics. In particular, the metrics asso-
ciated with such an attack can be incomparable (e.g.,
network’s connectivity and total throughput). To deal with
the incomparable metrics problem, this paper makes the
following contributions:
(1) A general stochastic game involving the protec-
tion of a network, where a jammer might sense
nodes’ scanning and switch to a hiding (i.e., silent)
mode, is suggested. In the considered model, the
meaning of the instantaneous costs depends on
the type of jamming attack strategy being applied.
For the attack aimed at harming network connec-
tivity, the instantaneous costs for the jammer are
described by the algebraic connectivity or Fiedler
value of the network [10,11]. For the attack aimed
at harming throughput, the costs are the network’s
throughput. It is important to note that because
the network protector aims to maximize cost of an
adversary’s attack, this game is fundamentally about
the prevention of an attack rather than about the
network’s protection.
(2) Because the longer an attack is unsuccessful leads to
higher cost, we propose a unified metric that makes
it possible to compare such attacks whose metrics
of success (e.g., harming connectivity or through-
put) would otherwise be incompatible. In particular,
we propose the use of the attack’s expected dura-
tion and, based on this common metric, we arrive
at a mechanism of maxmin selection for nodes’
scanning strategy is suggested.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related
works are discussed. In Section 3, jamming attacks aimed
at undermining network connectivity and network through-
put are presented, as well as a preliminary overview of
algebraic connectivity. In Section 4, the problem of pre-
venting an attack against a network is formulated as a
stochastic game, and it is solved explicitly. In Section 5,
a tool for comparing defenses against jamming attacks
aimed to harm different network characteristics is devel-
oped. In Section 6, results of numerical evaluation for the
optimal solutions and their dependence on network char-
acteristics are supplied. Finally, in Section 7, conclusions
are given.
2. RELATED WORKS
Studies that explore the connectivity of networks and
their topological properties can be found in the litera-
ture and a sample includes[12–14]. The mostly widely
adopted approach for summarizing a network’s topological
connectivity involves the calculation or prediction of node
degree from statistical results. Network connectivity data
have been collected from a variety of real networks, such
as social networks[15] and citation networks[16], and is
complemented by mathematical models, such as scale-free
networks, where the node degree follows a probability dis-
tribution that decays in a power-law, or a Poisson random
networks, whose nodal probability distribution follows a
Poisson distribution.
An important research area that applies to all of the net-
work models mentioned earlier involves studying network
connectivity under malicious attacks. While these attacks
can happen at each network layer, most research about
network connectivity traditionally focuses on designing
secure routing protocols by which packets can route around
a black hole or wormhole in networks[17–19]. Those rout-
ing protocols usually aim to find the most efficient and free
path in a topological graph after an attack happens. On the
other hand, the impact of a broken single link or removal of
a node in a path, and the resulting diffusion of attack dam-
age across the broader network context has been studied
much less, particularly when the connectivity issues appear
at the physical layer.
Ensuring the robustness of the physical layer typi-
cally involves examining links in isolation (e.g., robust
error coding), and notably separate from the broader net-
work context. The robustness of networks at the physical
layer should examine the network’s performance after one
node/link, or even several nodes/links, are degraded or
removed at the physical layer. For example, an attacker
can randomly delete several nodes or strategically delete
nodes according to his purposes though targeted interfer-
ence, aimed at greedily removing nodes with higher degree
first or deleting nodes in high density areas in order to
exacerbate the damage. To the best of our knowledge, most
prior research into the resilience of networks are statistical,
and they fail to consider the interaction between legitimate
nodes and the attacker and, moreover, tend to consider
that the jammer behavior is random in how it eliminates
nodes, without a deeper strategy behind how to maximize
its attack effectiveness.
Game theory is a natural tool to investigate and rational-
ize about a jammer’s behavior. Game theory investigates
the interactions between players to arrive at equilibrium
strategies for both sides[20]. In [21], a survey of works
that applied game theory to deal with network security at
each layer is given. Physical layer security can be described
by game theory both in the form of a Nash game and a
Stackelberg game. Game theory papers at the physical
layer security often model the rational behaviors of a jam-
mer, or an eavesdropper, or cooperative behavior between
them, to solve the problem of allocating transmission
power or increasing transmission rate. Typically, the util-
ity function being employed is Shannon capacity, signal to
interference and noise ratio (SINR), information entropy or
bit error equations. There is a limited set of works dealing
with maintaining the connectivity of the network topology.
In [22], a problem of minimizing the probability that the
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spanning tree disrupted by an adversary attack was stud-
ied. In [23], to identify key players engaged in attacking
a network, the Shapley value was applied. In [24], a prob-
lem with two types (good and bad) of users was studied by
a repeated game, where good users were willing to trade
energy for connectivity depending on neighbors’ behav-
iors, while bad users try to destroy connectivity and lure the
good users to waste energy. In this paper, we consider the
game where users’ throughput, and network connectivity
are combined in a unified framework.
3. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
As a motivating scenario, we consider a zone that involves
n nodes (users) allocated at points (y1i, y2i), i 2 [1, n]
and operating in a P2P full duplex communication fash-
ion, which allows nodes to communicate in both directions.
Let ei,j be a duplex communication link (a channel) for
communication between node i and j. A possible connec-
tion between any two nodes is defined by the channel’s
condition, the mutual distance between nodes, receiver
threshold, transmission power, and transmission protocols,
that is, the collision avoidance protocol in Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer. Let h = ˚hi,jni,j=1 be an n  n
matrix describing the communication capabilities between
nodes (fading channel gains). Generally, this matrix might
be non-symmetrical, that is, the component hij, mapping
communication from node i to node j, might be differ-
ent from the component hji, mapping communication from
node j to node i. Some components of matrix h might be
zero, reflecting the fact that either communication between
these nodes is not allowed, or this node has no intent
to communicate with another. For a particular, hii = 0
for any i, as there is no need for a node to commu-
nicate with itself. Therefore, based on these conditions,
the complete possible communication topology is already
determined. Let Pi,j, i, j 2 {1, : : : , n} be transmission pro-
tocol between nodes, that is, Pi,j represents transmission
power from sender i to receiver j on channel ei,j. Then, by
applying a Shannon-type formulation for channel capac-
ity, the throughput for communication node i to node j is
Ti,j = ln

1 + hi,jPi,j/(2 +
Pn
k=1,k 6=j hk,jPk,j)

, where 2 is
the background noise.
In the zone, besides of the legitimate nodes, an adver-
sary jammer equipped with limited power is present
to harm communication. Its location is given by the
coordinates x = (x1, x2). The effect of jamming
(jammed throughput) for communication node i to node j
is ln

1 + hi,jPi,j/(2 +
Pn
k=1,k 6=i hk,jPk,j + gjJ/d2j )

which
depends on the distance dj =
q
(x1 – yj1)2 + (x2 – yj2)2
between the jammer and the receiver, the fading channel
gain gj, and the jamming power J being applied. Because
the jammer has a power limitation, he cannot effectively
impact the communication of nodes located far away.
However, if the attacker is allocated close by a particular
node, then the jammer can effectively jam that node from
all incoming traffic received. Because of all incoming mes-
sages for the jammed node are blocked, the acknowledge
messages(ACK) corresponding to his request to establish
communication with other nodes are also blocked [25].
Thus, the jammed node cannot recognize its neighboring
nodes, and hence it cannot communicate with them. So,
when the jammer is attacking a node, it can disrupt bi-
lateral communications (incoming and outcoming) for that
node. In the meantime, the Request to Send/Clear to Send
problem can also make the receiver detecting the existence
of a hidden terminal and ceasing the transmission to the
target. Ultimately, the jammer achieves his goal by block-
ing the whole receiving and sending functions of the target.
To describe the effects of blocking such bi-lateral com-
munications, we assume the jammer’s ability to block the
communications is equivalent to its ability to disrupt the
communication links in bilaterally.
Note there are lots of types of jamming attacks. A reader
can find comprehensive surveys of such threats in [26]. In
this research, we introduce a new type of attacks which
targets the network’s connectivity, and compare it with the
jamming attack which targets the network’s throughput.
3.1. Cost of breaking connectivity attack
In this section, we describe breaking connectivity attack
and its cost. This is a jamming attack targeting to break
duplex communication links between nodes. In order to
break a link from sender to receiver in its physical layer,
the received SINR must be smaller than the threshold !.
Let the threshold be the same for all the nodes. Then, we
can express the condition of a broken link from node i to
node j by
hi,jPi,j
2 +
Pn
k=1,k 6=i hk,jPk,j + gjJ/d2j
< !. (1)
Thus, to break communication from node i to node j, the
following induced jamming power has to be applied
6664hi,jPi,j
!
– 2 –
nX
k=1,k 6=i
hk,jPk,j
7775
+
 gjJ
d2j
, (2)
where bc+ = max{ , 0}. Because of block ACK to break
all the bilateral links on node j from other nodes, the
following induced jamming power has to be applied:
max
i,i 6=j
6664hi,jPi,j
!
– 2 –
nX
k=1,k 6=i
hk,jPk,j
7775
+
 gjJ
d2j
. (3)
This condition can be achieved by having sufficient
closely positioned adversary to node j in spite of its limited
jamming resource. Such adversary’s strategy allows the
elimination of a selected node from networks communica-
tion to cause network disruption in terms of connectivity.
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Figure 1. Fiedler values of different remaining graph are comparable when the number of nodes is the same.
To deal with the remaining network connectivity, a concept
of Fiedler value[27] developed in spectral graph theory can
be applied.
Fiedler value is the second smallest eigenvalue of
the Laplacian matrix, L(V , E), of a network’s topological
graph, (V , E) where V is a vertex set and E is the edge
set connecting two vertices in the graph. The Fiedler value
is always non-negative, and its amplitude is proportional to
the graph connectivity. It is zero if and only if the graph
is disconnected. The number of zero eigenvalues in the
eigenvalue set of L equals to the number of connected com-
ponents in a graph. According to [28], the Fiedler value
represented by 1, of a graph,  , can be obtained by the
following eigenvalue optimization problem.
1 = min yT L(V , E)y
st. yT y = 1 and yT e = 0
(4)
where y is a vector which does not equal to e, with eT =
(1, 1, : : : , 1), and MT is a transpose to matrix M.
The Laplacian matrix of a given graph is defined as
follows: Given a graph (V , E) without self cycles and
multiple links between two nodes, the Laplacian matrix L
is calculated by
L(V , E) = D(V , E) – A(V , E) (5)
where D(V , E) is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entry
contains the degrees for each node. A(V , E) is the adja-
cency matrix with each entry being a value of zero or one
when nodes are connected to each other. In addition, its
diagonal is zero because (V , E) has no self cycles.
In a network topology graph, V is the set of users,
and E is the set of links which support duplex commu-
nications, we assume a link exists if and only if bilateral
communication between two users is possible.
Because the amplitude of Fiedler value is proportional
to the connectivity of networks which is known as the
algebraic connectivity, we adopt the algebraic connectiv-
ity as our connectivity metric. The smaller the Fiedler
value is, the larger the negative impact is onto the net-
works. Assume i is Fiedler value of a graph \{i} by
removing all the incident edges attached to node i in the
graph  . Here, we consider a jammer can only turn off one
node. These Fiedler values,{i(\{i})|i = 1, 2, : : : , n}, on
remaining graphs obtained by removing a different node
from the same graph,  , are comparable in terms of graph
connectivity although they have different connections on
the same number of vertexes. i(\{i}) does not relate
to the position of node in the graph and nodes’ labels.
Figure 1 shows an example that the connectivity in differ-
ent graphs obtained by removing different nodes from the
same graph is comparable as long as the number of nodes
in remaining graph is the same.
If the jammer aims to reduce network connectivity,
Fiedler Value {i} can be considered as the cost of such
adversary’s attack. Namely, the jammer’s cost of attack to
disrupt connectivity is
Ni = i(\{i}). (6)
3.2. Cost of jamming throughput attack
If the adversary targets to harm network’s throughput, then
the total number of throughput for the unaffected network
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:6080–6093 © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 6083
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can be considered as a cost of such attack. If the adversary
has a selected node i for low-power jamming attack, and
because this attack also blocks ACK, the total throughput
for the rest of the network, or the cost of the throughput
jamming attack is given as follows:
Ni =
nX
l,j=1,j 6=i,l 6=i
ln
 
1 +
hl,jPl,j
2 +
Pn
k=1,k 6=j hk,jPk,j
!
. (7)
4. A STOCHASTIC GAME OF
INTRUSION PREVENTION
We consider, as a motivating application, the problem of
mitigating an attack directed against an ad hoc network,
as depicted in Figure 2. In this scenario, a jammer aims
to hurt network by choosing a node to direct interference
against, while the network itself aims to reduce the harm
this attack has on the network by scanning to detect the
harm and ultimately force the adversary into more costly
option for conducting its attack.
The category of jammer’s attack is fixed in the entire
intrusion, which might either be a category of jamming
throughput or disrupting connectivity attack. The jammer
senses a node which could mostly jeopardize network
connectivity through blocking its communication.
In some probability, if the victim node determined by
a jammer is also simultaneously scanned by the scanner,
because the scanner is present (a jammer can observe pres-
ence of authority by only watching or executing some
detection techniques which is why he has no intention
to perform jamming attack because of the fear of being
caught), the jammer switches to the hiding (silent) mode,
and if he is not caught, he can continue his attack. However,
if the node he chooses is not scanned, the jammer performs
an attack. Let Ch be the cost of hiding mode for the jam-
mer corresponding to an applied category of the attack. Let
˛ be the probability to be detected in the hiding mode, and
1–˛ be the probability not to be detected. Thus, the instan-
taneous cost to the jammer combines the expected hiding
cost and cost of network penetration in future if the jammer
is not caught. Please note our method can also be applied
to hierarchical networks (say, Wifi networks) by assigning
more weights to critical nodes, such as access points and
cluster heads.
Therefore, we propose the strategies to prevent such
attacks in addition to the design of a defense net-
work. Assuming the instantaneous payoff to the legitimate
authority equals the instantaneous cost to the jammer. This
recursively played zero-sum game G can be considered
as a single state stochastic game ([29]), which we are going
to solve by stationary strategies (i.e., the strategies which
do not depend on history and time slot), and it is given as
follows:
G =
0
BB@
1 2 : : : n
1 Ch + G N2 : : : Nn
2 N1 Ch + G : : : Nn
... : : : : : : : : : : : :
n N1 N2 : : : Ch + G
1
CCA,
(8)
Figure 2. A connectivity attack in an ad hoc network.
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where rows correspond to the authority’s strategies, that
is, chosen nodes to scan, and columns correspond to the
jammer’s strategies, that is, chosen nodes to attack.
Let us describe in details the components of this matrix.
Assume the authority has chosen strategy i, and the jammer
has chosen strategy j. If i ¤ j, node j is jammed success-
fully, the jammer suffers the instantaneous cost Nj, and the
game is over. If i = j then the jammer switches to the
hiding mode paying instantaneous cost Ch. With probabil-
ity ˛, the jammer will be detected, and the game is over.
However, if the jammer is not detected, with probability
1 – ı, he stops the attempts and exits the game. The game
is over. Whereas, with probability ı, the jammer keeps
playing the game recursively. Therefore, the instantaneous
reward for authority is ˛Ch + (1 – ˛)

Ch + ı  val(G )

.
Then, the conditional probability to keep on the jamming
attacks is  = (1–˛)ı, and with this probability the game G
is played recursively with the expected instantaneous jam-
mer’s costs accumulated as Ch + G . Because  < 1, it
can be considered as a discount factor and is the condi-
tion that guarantees the convergence of the solution. Here,
employing stochastic game tools is quite natural, because
the authority and the jammer have opposing objectives,
and it is uncertain how persistent the jammer can man-
age to perform its malicious attack before it is detected.
The applications of stochastic games in modeling network
security can be found in [30–33] and [34]. Finally, note
that the game (8) can be used to model different types
of attacks by assigning appropriate content of its param-
eters. Accordingly, the variable, Ni, can correspond to
either the network’s connectivity in a connectivity disrup-
tion attack, or the network’s throughput in a throughput
disruption attack.
Game G has a solution in (mixed) stationary strate-
gies, that is, the strategies that are independent of history
and current time slot. A (mixed) stationary strategy to the
authority is a probability vector pT = (p1, p2, : : : , pn),
where pi is the probability to scan node i and eT p = 1.
A (mixed) stationary strategy to the jammer is a probabil-
ity vector qT = (q1, q2, : : : , qn), where qi is the probability
to jam node i, and eT q = 1. Solution of the game G is
given as a solution to the Shapley (-Bellmann) equation
game [29]:
val(G ) = max
p0,eT p=1
min
q0,eT q=1
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
Aij(val(G ))piqj,
= min
q0,eT q=1
max
p0,eT p=1
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
Aij(val(G ))piqj,
(9)
Aij(x) =
(
Ch + x, i = j,
Nj, i ¤ j,
(10)
and V := val(G ) is the value of the game, that is, the
optimal accumulated cost to the jammer.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the
nodes have different jamming costs, that is, Ni 6= Nj for
i 6= j. Also, let all the nodes are indexed in ascending order
by Ni, that is,
N1 < N2 < : : : < Nn. (11)
Despite the fact that the stochastic game considered
has n  n instantaneous payoff matrix, we can obtain
the solution explicitly from the following theorem given
below:
Theorem 1. The stochastic game G has an equilib-
rium in stationary strategies (p, q) and the value V given
as follows:
(a) Let
Ch/(1 –  ) < N1. (12)
Then
V = N1,
pi
(
= 0, i = 1,
 Ni– N1Ni–Ch– N1 , i  2,
qi =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2.
(13)
(b) Let
N1  Ch/(1 –  ) < 2. (14)
Then
V = Ch/(1 –  ),
pi(x) =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2,
qi(x) =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2.
(15)
(c) Let
Nk < Ch/(1 –  )  Nk+1 (16)
with n+1 = 1, and m 2 [1, k] be such that
'k+1m  1 < 'k+1m+1, (17)
with
'k+1s =
sX
i=1
Ns – Ni
Ch +  Ns – Ni
for s  k (18)
and 'k+1k+1 = 1. Note that, by (16), 'k+1s is increasingfrom zero for s = 1 to infinity for s = k + 1. Thus, m is
uniquely defined by (17).
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Then,
pi =
8<
:
V– Ni
Ch+V – Ni , i  m,
0, i > m,
qi =
8ˆˆ<
ˆˆ:
1/(Ch+V – Ni)
mP
j=1
1/(Ch+V – Nj)
, i  m,
0, i > m,
(19)
and V is an unique root of the equation
Fm(V ) :=
mX
i=1
V – Ni
Ch + V – Ni
= 1. (20)
Proof. First note that V , p and q is a solution of Shapley
Equation (9) if and only if
V = , (21)
max ,
nX
i=1
Aij(V )pi  , i 2 {1, : : : , n},
p is probability vector,
(22)
min ,
nX
j=1
Aij(V )qi  , j 2 {1, : : : , n},
q is probability vector.
(23)
Taking into account (10) and the fact that p and q are prob-
ability vectors yield that these LP problems (22) and (23)
are equivalent to
max ,
(Ch + V – Ni)pi + Ni  , i 2 {1, : : : , n},
p is probability vector,
(24)
min ,
(Ch + V – Ni)qi +
nX
j=1
Njqj  , j 2 {1, : : : , n},
q is probability vector
(25)
Then, (21), (24), and (25) imply that V , p and q is a solu-
tion of Shapley Equation (9) if and only if the following
conditions hold:
(C + V – Ni)qi +
nX
j=1
Njqj
(
= V , pi > 0,
 V , pi = 0,
(26)
(C + V – Ni)pi + Ni
(
= V , qi > 0,
 V , qi = 0.
(27)
Let (12) hold. Then, by (11), (26), and (27), there is no
i such that pi > 0 and qi > 0. Also, q1 = 1 and p1 = 0.
Substituting them into (26) and (27) implies (a).
Let (12) do not hold. Then, by (11), (26). and (27), there
is a m such that pi > 0 and qi > 0.
pi

> 0, i  m,
= 0, i > m and qi

> 0, i  m,
= 0, i > m. (28)
Let m = 1. Then, by (11), (26), and (27), the condition
(14) has to hold, and (b) follows.
Let (16) hold. Note that
max
( Ni – Ch

,
Ni
)
=
8<
:
Ni–Ch
 ,
Ni  Ch1– ,
Ni, Ni  Ch1– .
(29)
Because m > 1, by (11), (26), (27), and (28) p and q have
to have the form given by (19). Then, because sums of the
components of vector p equals 1, V has to be given as a
root of the Equation (20). It is only left to show that this
equation has a unique root. Let m < k. Then, by (11) and
(29), Fm is increasing in [ Nm, Nm+1] such that, by (17),
Fm( Nm) = 'k+1m  1 < 'k+1m+1 = Fm( Nm+1). Thus, V is
uniquely defined. Let m = k. Then, by (11) and (29), Fk is
increasing in [ Nk, ( Nk – C)/ ], and Fk(( Nk – C)/ ) > 1, and
(c) follows.
Theorem 1 allows to observe some interesting proper-
ties of the solution.
If hiding cost Ch is too big, namely, Ch  Nn, then
all the nodes will be under attack, and thus, have to be
scanned, that is, pi > 0 and qi > 0 for any i, and the value
of the game is the unique root of the equation Fn(V ) = 1.
Also, the value V of the game is increasing on Ch and 
where including  = 1.
Because the game G0 is one time slot game, it is just a
matrix game. Its solution is given in the following theorem
in the closed form.
Theorem 2. One time slot matrix game G0, which is the
limit of the stochastic game G for  tends to zero, has
value V0 = V(Ch) and the equilibrium strategies p and q
given as follows:
(a) Let
Ch < N1. (30)
Then
V(Ch) = N1,
pi
8<
:
= 0, i = 1,
 Ni– N1Ni–Ch , i  2,
qi(x) =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2.
(31)
6086 Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:6080–6093 © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Y. Liu, A. Garnarv and W. Trappe Connectivity jamming game for physical layer attack in peer to peer networks
Figure 3. Convergence of iterative procedure for n = 5, N =
(1.11, 4.31, 6.12, 8.31, 9.11), Ch = 1 and  = 0.7.
(b) Let
N1  Ch < N2. (32)
Then
V(Ch) = Ch,
pi =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2,
qi =

1, i = 1,
0, i  2.
(33)
(c) Let
Nk < Ch  Nk+1 (34)
and m be given by (17). Then,
V(Ch) =
1 +
mP
j=1
Nj/(Ch – Nj)
mP
j=1
1/(Ch – Nj)
,
pi =
8<
:
V(Ch)– Ni
Ch– Ni , i  m,
0, i > m,
qi =
8ˆ<
:ˆ
1/(Ch– Ni)
mP
j=1
1/(Ch– Nj)
, i  m,
0, i > m.
(35)
Theorem 2 also allows to suggest two procedures to find
the value of the stochastic game.
Theorem 3. The value of the stochastic game G is given
as follows
V =
x – Ch

,
where x  Ch is a unique root of the equation
x – Ch

= V(x). (36)
The unique root of (36) can be found by
(a) iterative procedure x0 = Ch, xi+1 = V(xi) + Ch,
i = 0, 1, : : : until |xi+1 – xi|   with  is tolerance.
(b) bisection method because (x – Ch)/ – V(x) =
–Ch/ – (0) < 0 for x = 0 and (x – Ch)/ – (x) > 0
for enough large x.
Figure 3 illustrates convergence of iterative procedure
to the equilibrium point.
5. MAXMIN SELECTION OF
SCANNING STRATEGY
In reality, the jammer can deteriorate network performance
in many aspects such as reducing either its connectivity or
throughput or secrecy communication. Motivated by these
different categories of malicious activity, the jammer could
vary the corresponding optimal strategies. However, the
authority might have no knowledge of the jammer’s moti-
vation for an attack, and so about the strategy employed.
The authority might only know the set of all possible moti-
vations and the corresponding optimal strategies used by
the jammer.
Under this situation, the need for comparing these
strategies arises because they aim to achieve different met-
rics. Say, connectivity is a metric for the strategies which
aim to jeopardize network connectivity, whereas, through-
put is a metric for the strategies which aim to harm the
throughput. However, in spite of differences in metrics,
the ultimate goal of a jammer is to speed up the process
of completing the attack because long time commitment
involves more cost. Thus, the expected time of successful
attack can be considered as a common metric for all the
categories of malicious activity, where the authority wants
to maximize this metric while the jammer aims to mini-
mize it. If we assume the rival chooses a specific category
and he follows the category over time before completing
the attack, then the expected jamming time, T , before a
successful attack appears, can be represented as following:
T (p, q) =
1X
t=1
t
2
4
 
nX
i=1
piqi
!t–1  
1 –
nX
i=1
piqi
!35 (37)
=
1
1 – pT q
. (38)
Where q is a probability vector which represents a category
of strategies employed by the jammer. p is a probabil-
ity vector which represents a category of strategy applied
by the authority to scan the attack. Thus, these strategies
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Figure 4. Stochastic game: accumulated connectivity (up) and throughput (down) costs as function of receiver’s signal to interference
and noise ratio threshold, !, and probability of re-playing the game,  .
depend on the category of malicious activity chosen by
the jammer.
Although suggested approach might be applied to any
category of an attack, to get insight of the problem, we
focus only on two which are also the most important met-
rics for network performance, namely, network’s connec-
tivity and network’s throughput. We denote these metrics
(connectivity, throughput) by the symbols, “c” and “t”.
The optimal strategy pair, (pc, qc) for dealing with attack
aiming to destroy connectivity, was found in the previ-
ous section. The optimal strategies (pt, qt) for dealing with
attack aiming to harm throughput, can be found by substi-
tuting connectivity cost Ni with total remaining throughput
expressed in Equation (7) into matrix (8).
The authority wants to maximize the jammer’s attack-
ing time in order to force the jammer to make his attack
more expensive. Whereas, the jammer wants to minimize
it. The authority does not know what category of the
attack the jammer intends to follow. The jammer does
not know versus what category of the attack the author-
ity intends to build up his defense. Thus, the rival faces
with a dilemma of choosing the proper strategies. This
dilemma can be described by the following zero-sum 2  2
matrix game
D =
 c t
c T(pc, qc) T(pc, qt)
t T(pt, qc) T(pt, qt)
	
,
where rows correspond to the authority’s strategies, that
is, choosing attack’s category to response, and columns
correspond to the jammer’s strategies, that is, choosing
attack’s category.
This matrix game has an equilibrium ([35]) either in
pure strategies, that is, when the rival selects a specific
one, or in mixed strategies, when the rival randomizes his
selection. Because the game is zero-sum, then the author-
ity’s equilibrium strategy is also his maxmin strategy, that
is, it is the best response strategy for the most dangerous
adversary’s attack. This result is given in the following
two propositions.
Proposition 1. The game has an equilibrium in (pure)
strategies if and only if the following conditions hold:
(1) If pTt qc  pTc qc  pTc qt then (c, c) is an equilibrium,
(2) If pTc qc  pTt qc  pTt qt then (t, c) is an equilibrium,
(3) If pTt qt  pTc qt  pTc qc then (c, t) is an equilibrium,
(4) If pTc qt  pTt qt  pTt qc then (t, t) is an equilibrium.
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Figure 5. Stochastic game: (a) the authority’s strategy for connectivity game, (b) the jammer’s strategy for connectivity game, (c)
the authority strategy for throughput jamming game and (d) the jammer’s strategy for throughput jamming game as functions of
probability for the game to be continued,  .
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Proposition 2. If there is no equilibrium in pure strate-
gies, the rival applies the randomized strategies. Namely,
with probability, xc (xt), the authority should defend
against “c” (“t”) attack’s category, and with probability,
yc (yt), the jammer applies strategy corresponding to “c”
(“t”) attack’s category, where
xc =
T(pt, qt) – T(pt, qc)
T(pc, qc) + T(pt, qt) – T(pc, qt) – T(pt, qc)
,
xt = 1 – xc,
yc =
T(pt, qt) – T(pc, qt)
T(pc, qc) + T(pt, qt) – T(pc, qt) – T(pt, qc)
,
yt = 1 – yc.
(39)
6. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical results are given to illustrate
the impact of network parameters, such as transmission
power of nodes and SINR’s threshold, on maintaining the
communication links. In simulation setting, the network
consists of six nodes, that is, n = 6 with background
noise 2 equals to one. The authority scans the network
to prevent malicious activity, and he does not participate
in packet transmissions. The channel gain matrix, h, are
randomly generated and given as follows:
h =
2
6666664
0 0.3128 1.1790 1.6488 1.6335 0.8458
0.3128 0 0.4524 1.9653 0.5215 0.1885
1.1790 0.4524 0 1.4605 1.1887 1.1970
1.6488 1.9653 1.4605 0 0.0450 0.9418
1.6355 0.5215 1.1887 0.0450 0 1.3919
0.8458 0.1885 1.1970 0.9418 1.3919 0
3
7777775
.
For each node as a transmission protocol, we consider the
uniform power allocation that transmits the same power
signals to its neighbors, but each node, of course, can have
different total power levels. Here, we consider that trans-
mission powers (P1 and P2) of node 1 and 2 vary from 0 to
20. Transmission power of node 3, P3, is 11. P4 is 10. P5
is 9. P6 is 8. Note that, the protocol of uniformly allocating
transmission power is proved to be optimal for indepen-
dent and identically distributed Gaussian channels[36,37].
Thus, given h, P, 2 and receiving threshold, they already
define a network’s topology.
Figure 4 illustrates the accumulated connectivity and
throughput costs, that is, the value V of the game G , as
function of receiver’s SINR threshold, !, and probability
of re-playing the game,  . It shows that the accumulated
jamming cost decreases with increasing threshold because
the larger value of threshold assumes smaller effort to
break communication links, and so smaller efforts to harm
networks’ connectivity. Also, increasing probability of re-
playing the game,  , yields in raising the value of the game,
and so the jamming cost because longer duration of the
game calls for the growth on the accumulated hiding cost.
The smallest jamming cost is achieved when  = 0, which
Figure 6. Stochastic game: accumulated connectivity (up) and
throughput (down) costs as functions of transmission powers of
node 1 and node 2.
is when the jammer can manage to perform only one time
shot attack.
Figure 5 illustrates the authority’s and the jammer’s
strategies for connectivity and throughput jamming game
as function of probability for the game are continuous. It
shows how the jammer tries to avoid being detected by the
authority, in order to perform a successful attack.
Figure 6 illustrates the relations between the jamming
cost and transmission power. These relations are piece-
wise continuous with jumps happen in between. Increasing
transmission power causes adding new communication
links into the network topology. This yields into increasing
Fiedler value and throughput by jumps. Thus, it pro-
duces the leap in the value of the game. Because the
interference is not considered in the simulation for show-
ing an obvious tendency without fluctuation, the value of
connectivity game is piece-wise constant on transmission
power while the value of throughput jamming game is
piece-wise continuous.
Figure 7(a) illustrates the probability that the authority
intends to deal with an attack aiming to disrupt connec-
tivity as function of transmission power of node 2. It
shows that bigger probability  assumes smaller transmis-
sion power in order to switch to mixed strategy. Also, the
authority’s strategy on maintaining connectivity is non-
increasing on the transmission power. Figure 7(b) illus-
trates the expected duration of the game as function on
transmission power of node 2. On the same reason as one
for the value of the game, namely, changing in the net-
work’s topology due to adding new links, the expected
duration of the game are piece-wise continuous function
on the transmission power.
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Figure 7. Maxmin selection of scanning strategy: (a) the probability that the authority intends to deal with attack aiming to disrupt
connectivity, and (b) the expected durations of the game as function on transmission power of node 2.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, costs for jamming attack on connectivity
and throughput are introduced. Then, a uniform stochastic
game with network scanning to prevent jamming attack is
suggested and solved explicitly. Because of different aims,
the jammer might choose different categories of attacks,
for example, connectivity and throughput. Comparing such
incomparable attacks is a challenge. To deal with this issue,
an approach is suggested to compare them by duration of
attack instead of the damage they bring to. Game theoret-
ical model for such comparison is suggested, and optimal
strategies are proposed. Results for numerical evaluation
of the optimal solutions and their dependence on network’s
characteristics are supplied. A goal of our future work
is to investigate more sophisticate behavior of the adver-
sary where he can switch between different categories of
malicious activities based on the archived result of attack,
and to incorporate mechanism of learning in the authority
strategy based on the accumulated results of scanning.
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